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Introduction
Stevenson and Scambler’s article makes two major claims. The first is that
the trust patients have in their doctors has declined in recent years; the
second is that, in consequence, concordance, that assumes open communi-
cation between doctor and patient, is now becoming impossible to achieve.
I will argue that the first claim is unproven (and unprovable) and that the
second is correct, but not for the reasons the authors suggest.
Declining trust
The first two-thirds of the article argues that patients are growing less
trusting of their doctors (and health care organizations) than in the past.
The claim is made tentatively in the early pages – there is the ‘possibility’
of declining trust or there ‘may’ be a decline in trust – but soon crystallizes
into more dogmatic statements such as ‘The trust people instinctively
invested in professional expertise has substantially diminished’. Yet only
three pieces of evidence are used to support the claim: the first is a predic-
tion (from one observer) that concerns about health plans in the US would
spill over into attitudes towards personal trust between doctor and patient;
the second is that there is an increase in litigation against doctors (does this
indicate a decline in trust or easier recourse to legal redress?); and the third
that there are increased challenges to medical experimentation. None of
this evidence is very persuasive that trust in the patient’s own doctor has
declined. Even less convincing are the supportive comments from others
who cling to this article of conventional wisdom. For example, surely the
editor of the British Medical Journal should not be taken too literally when
he announces with great rhetorical flourish that ‘trust will never be the same
again’ following a report on the latest health care scandal. Did anyone’s
trust in their medical practitioner change the day after, I wonder?
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The problem of course is that there can be no clinching evidence either
way on the decline of trust in medicine since patients have not been
systematically consulted on the question over the last century. Indeed, the
very idea of eliciting patients’ views is little over half a century old
(Armstrong, 1984). Yet even the limited evidence from these early studies
does not support the idea of a golden age of trust that now is lost. In The
Health of Regionsville (Koos, 1954), for example, a quarter of patients
expressed dissatisfaction with their last consultation; and in Cartwright’s 1967
study of patients and their doctors, less than a quarter of respondents ticked
the option that their doctor ‘puts (you) at ease, you can talk to him’. Further,
only 17–41 percent of patients (depending on age) would be happy to discuss
a personal problem with their doctor. And from the 1970s there is the
dawning realization that perhaps 50 percent of patients were not taking their
medication as advised (building on earlier work on the problem of ‘default-
ing’ from treatment) (Ley, 1982). Such survey findings are not sufficient to
show conclusively that trust has not declined but they do imply that the
opening argument of this article needs treating with considerable scepticism.
Yet whether or not there really has been a decline in trust seems less
important than the conceptual muddle about the relationship of communi-
cation to trust, which forms the essential context for the later discussion of
concordance. The key argument is taken from Gilson (2003) who argued
that ‘trust, by keeping minds open to all evidence, secures communication
and dialogue’. But, surely, trust is the complete antithesis of this. It is only
when there is trust – in a brother, a friend, a child – that there is no need
to ‘keep minds open to all evidence’ as there is no need for suspicion or
doubt or need for vigilance for acts of betrayal. Equally, patients would
surely have more intensive ‘communication and dialogue’ with doctors they
did not trust than with ones they did (‘Thank you doctor, as I trust you I’ll
just do what you advise’). So, does trust imply communication and dialogue,
as argued here? Or should we be persuaded by Mechanic’s claim (also
endorsed here) that ‘patient trust depends on the capacity of clinicians and
health organizations to communicate effectively’ (Mechanic, 1998: 299),
that is, rather than trust securing communication it is good communication
that engenders trust? Or maybe the authors want it both ways.
In summary, the article’s opening claim seems empirically unsupported
(and perhaps untestable) and the form of the relationship of trust with
communication uncertain. Nonetheless, the argument of the article depends
on such an (empirical) decline in trust and on the belief that declining trust
compromises good communication. These assumptions underpin the final
discussion on the form and limitations of concordance.
Concordance in context
The idea of concordance, as the authors point out, was first proposed by
Marinker and several colleagues in 1997. Concordance involved ‘an open
health: 9(1)
24
02 048092 (to/d)  12/11/04  10:06 am  Page 24
exchange of beliefs about medicine about which prescribing and medicine-
taking decisions may then be based’. The authors express this ideal of an
open exchange in Habermasian terms as ‘communicative action’ but then
insist that as neither party is likely to be entirely open about their views
(particularly in view of the supposed decline in trust) the result will, in fact,
be ‘systemically distorted communication’. A valid point for anyone
persuaded that complete openness about views and agendas in consultations
is highly unlikely – but who claimed that concordance was a form of
communicative action in the first place? There is brief reference to Britten’s
support for concordance as a means of acknowledging patient autonomy,
together with mention of Coulter’s advocacy of partnership models in inter-
action between doctor and patients (though she makes no mention of
concordance in her article). Otherwise there is no clear identification of who
promotes concordance as this open ideal, even less who believes it to repre-
sent communicative action. The article’s language is always suggestive: ‘the
concordance ideal may be presented in terms of the ideal of communicative
action’ or ‘concordance may be interpreted as a call for communicative
action’ (my emphasis). Are we therefore to understand that it is the authors
themselves who are making these presentations and interpretations (before
debunking them)? Add to this the knowledge that these two authors figure
prominently in the literature that promotes a Habermasian view of the
consultation (Barry et al., 2000; Scambler and Britten, 2001) and they seem
to be going to curious lengths to attack themselves.
Part of the problem is that concordance is never placed in a wider context
that would allow better understanding of its claims Thus concordance’s
emphasis on sharing views and negotiating (patients’) behaviour places it
firmly in the ‘patient-centred’ or ‘shared decision-making‘ genre that
emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s. (Patient-centredness was adapted
by Byrne and Long in 1976 from the concept of illness-centredness that had
been developed by Balint et al. (1970) some years earlier.) The inventors
and proponents of concordance promoted it as a means of establishing a
therapeutic alliance between doctor and patient. This agenda reflected
contemporary concerns to facilitate shared decision-making in the
consultation as a counter to traditional medical dominance. Not only was
medical dominance unsuited to a consumerist age in which patients’ rights
were stressed by political commentators and their autonomy by ethicists,
but the old system was thought not to deliver effective health care. As noted,
successive studies had shown the wide extent of the problem of non-
compliance (recast more recently as non-adherence by psychologists anxious
to switch the emphasis from patients’ misbehaviour to patients making
choices). The task was how to influence patient behaviour.
Shared decision-making had a number of advantages. Sharing decisions
addressed the increasing need to recognize patients’ rights and autonomy;
they might solve the compliance problem as it would encourage patient
commitment to a course of action; and in shifting some of the responsibility
Armstrong: The Myth of Concordance
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for decisions from doctor to patient they might just relieve the doctor of
some clinical, psychological and legal burdens. Concordance was simply
one variant of this new approach to consultations. Not only was con-
cordance involved with shared decision-making but also in the view that a
shared decision secured the patient’s subsequent behaviour: an agreement
to take or not to take medication implied the patient would follow the
agreed course of action (though again the empirical basis for this assump-
tion is far from established).
In effect, the concept of concordance emerged at the confluence of a
number of different streams of political and clinical events. Concordance
gave patients shared decision-making and a consumer status in the
doctor–patient relationship; as noted, concordance might even have
persuaded the patient to take their medicines; and concordance had some
advantages for the doctor both in terms of more rewarding consultations
and decreased responsibility for taking on the burden of patients’ illnesses.
The concept of concordance was therefore an ideal solution to a number
of late-20th-century clinical problems. This means it can be cast in either
a positive or negative light, as either a liberating device (as in communi-
cative action) that gives power to the patient or, more cynically, as yet
another pernicious attempt by medicine to get the patient to behave
according to the doctor’s own wishes. The latter of course needs to conceal
its purpose by masquerading as the former. So let us not get starry-eyed
about concordance. The main goal of many (most?) of its proponents is
to get patients to take their medicines as directed, or at least not waste
them. Arguments in favour of concordance are consistently embedded in
discussion of the compliance ‘problem’ (which is of course a problem for
paternalistic medicine, not for patients who simply decide for themselves
whether to take their medicine as directed or not). Look at the publications
on the ‘Medicines Partnership: from compliance to concordance’ website
(http://www.medicines-partnership.org) or note the telling title of a recent
report from the UK House of Commons All-party Pharmacy Group,
‘Concordance and wasted medicines’. Concordance is fast becoming the
acceptable face of compliance: the goals remain the same but the tech-
nique is more subtle as patients are recruited to direct themselves in
medicine-taking. Could this ever have been communicative action? To
present a romantic and idealized view of the potential of concordance and
then to claim this dream has gone because trust has gone is simply to create
and then destroy a straw man. Concordance never could have been what
these authors clearly wish it had been.
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